Crimes and Civil Injuries by Hitchler, W.H.
Volume 39 
Issue 1 Dickinson Law Review - Volume 39, 
1934-1935 
10-1-1934 
Crimes and Civil Injuries 
W.H. Hitchler 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra 
Recommended Citation 
W.H. Hitchler, Crimes and Civil Injuries, 39 DICK. L. REV. 23 (1934). 
Available at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra/vol39/iss1/3 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Dickinson Law IDEAS. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Dickinson Law Review by an authorized editor of Dickinson Law IDEAS. For more 
information, please contact lja10@psu.edu. 
CRIMES AND CIVIL INJURIES
*W. H. HITCHLER
More than one hundred and fifty years ago Lord Mansfield said, "There
is no distinction better known than the distinction between civil and' criminal
law."1 This statement indicates the attitude of English and American law-
yers toward the distinction between crimes and civil injuries. They have
assumed that the distinction is clear and well-known, but very few of them
have attempted to explain what it is. Consequently, at present, though every
lawyer feels that there are obvious differences, none can state in exact terms
what they are.
The distinction'is in fact not an easy one to make, either in theory or in
practice. Attempts to state it have led to much inconclusive discussion. 2  "In
juristic doctrine endless technical distinctions have been drawn without arriv-
ing at anything which is a real difference, and even in their practical legal
effects it is not always easy to disentangle these various kinds of wrong, one
from another."s
This is not surprising, if we remember how recently in the history of the
law there emerged any conception of a distinction between crimes and civil
injuries.* In their origin crimes and civil injuries were almost indissolubly in-
termingled, and it was only by slow stages that a distinction between them
was made.5 The history of the Roman law shows a gradual and imperfect
emergence of public discipline out of private retribution, and this is some-
what true of the criminal law everywhere,s although in some stages of the
history of the criminal law of England, exactly the reverse process seems to
have taken place 7
*B.L., University of Virginia Law School. 1905; D.C.L., Dickinson College, 1932; LL.D..
St. Francis College, 1932; Professor Dickinson School of Law, 1906-; Dean of Dickinson
School of Law, 1930-.
'Atcheson v. Everett, 1 Cowp. 391.
2Witness this article.
3Allen, Legal Duties, p. 221.
'Kenny, Criminal Law, 14th ed., p. 21; Keeton. Jurisprudence, p. 191; Holland, Jurisprud-
ence, p. 357; Salmond, Jurisprudence, 7th ed., p. 120.
"Potter, English Law, p. 294; Winfield, The Law of Tort, p. 190; Miller, Criminal Law, p.
17. But Potter remarks of the English Law, "It is consistent with the conservatism of the
mediaeval mind that a separation of wrongs into tort and crime should be coincident with the
evolution of the idea of a state," p. 296.
GMaine says. "The penal law of ancient communities is not the law of crimes; it is the
law of wrongs, or, to use the English technical word, of torts."
'Keeton. Jurisprudence, p. 191; Jenks, The Book of English Law, p. 142; Kenny, Criminal
Law, 14th ed. p. 22; Hibbert, Jurisprudence, p. 188.
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
In England, in the first age of royal justice, the general law of the land
which governed the individual in his daily doings is what we should at pres-
ent call criminal law. The groups of rights and wrongs which now con-
stitute torts, contracts, and crimes had their origin "not in criminal law, for
that is to anticipate events, but in a system of rules which nowadays we
should consider essentially criminal.' '
It seems, therefore, that in the incalculable actions and reactions of his-
tory crime has sometimes arisen out of tort, and tort has sometimes arisen out
of crime. But whichever of these two processes has taken place, the con-
nection between the two forms of wrong is perpetual and inseverable. "But
there is a difference between them, and we must try to discover it."9
INHERENT QUALITY
There are authorities which assert that the distinction between a crime
and a civil injury is one of inherent quality or tendency. Immorality and in-
jury to the public, it is asserted, are the distinctive characteristics of crime.
The fallibility of these tests has been previously demonstrated.1- It is suffici-
ent to add as to the former, that there are many acts which are crimes which
have no ethical significance, and that many civil injuries are morally most
reprehensible. It is undoubtedly true, however, that throughout the whole
history of our law the element of intrinsic wrongfulness has had a great in-
fluence in determining criminality," and that the idea of moral wickedness is
more closely allied with that of crime than it is with contract or tort, for the
reason, among others, that in the latter cases the sanctions of the law are
more frequently inflicted for external conduct which is not the result of any
blameable state of mind.
12
THE INJURY INFLICTED
It is frequently asserted that crimes are public wrongs which injure the
community, and civil injuries are private wrongs which injure individuals only.
8AIlen, Legal Duties, p. 225. "When we look back to the first age of royal justice, we
see it doing little else than punishing crime and giving specific relief." Pollock & Maitland,
vol. 2, p. 523.
OAllen, Legal Duties, p. 226; Parsons, Crime and the Criminal, p. 139; Potter, English Law,
p. 295. "At the outset of the common law * * * * both in theory and practice there was a
perception of the distinction between civil and criminal proceedings, but there was no sharply
cut division between them. The two were a viscous intermixture." Winfield, The Law of
Tort, p. 190.
1038 Dickinson Law Review, p. 225.
"Allen, Legal Duties, p. 224.
12Kenny, Criminal Law. 14th. ed., p. 38. Crimes which involve no moral wrongfulness
are designated as mala prohibita. Their existence distinguishes the legal from the popular
conception of the term crime, and renders more difficult any consistent and useful definitions of
crime. Stephen, History of Criminal Law, vol. 1, p. 1.
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The distinction between crimes and civil injuries is thus identified by them
with that between public and private wrongs."9
The inaccuracy of this distinction, which may be called the Blackstonean
fallacy, but which is of importance because of the wide currency 1' which it has
obtained, has been previously discussed. 1 In considering this, it is necessary
to bear in mind the distinction between the direct and immediate tendency of
an act and its indirect and ultimate tendency. Nothing can injure society, the
public, or the state, without ultimately injuring a greater or less number of in-
dividuals, and, conversely, an injury to an individual is not often made a civil
injury unless it is felt to have a tendency ultimately to injure society." The
alleged distinction, therefore, does not have reference to the indirect or ulti-
mate tendency of acts, but to their direct and immediate tendency. 17  But it is
quite obvious that it is not every crime that directly injures the public or state,
as e. g., stealing or battery. although some, such as treason and nuisance,
may.
18
The distinction is, perhaps, not one of kind but of emphasis. Crimes are
acts which are made wrongful by the state primarily for the protection of the
community as a whole, although this may result secondarily in the protection
of the individual. Civil injuries, on the other hand, regard primarily the
rights of the person injured, although this may result ultimately in a happier,
more prosperous, and better ordered community.' 9
It is undoubtedly true that throughout the whole jurisprudence of crime
the "public" aspect of crime-the belief that crime is an offence not merely
against one but against all-has had a great influence in determining crimin-
ality. During the formative period of the common law this aspect of crime
was constantly adverted to, and this idea has not entirely disappeared. It is
still a general principle of the common law that an act calculated to produce
public mischief is a crime; and legislatures sometimes pretend, at least, to act
upon this principle. 2° There are many reasons, economic, political, cultural,
13 Blackstone, vol. 4, p. 5; Allen, Legal Duties, pp. 233, 234.
14Kenny, Criminal Law, 14th. ed., p. 5.
1538 Dickinson Law Review, p. 225. All public wrongs are not crimes and all crimes are
not public wrongs. Salmond, Jurisprudence, 7th. ed., p. 118.
131 Yale Law Review, p. 241. All wrongful conduct injures the state indirectly and ulti-
mately since the welfare of the state is made up of a sum total of the welfare of the individual
members thereof. Hibbert, Jurisprudence, p. 188.
17"Crime is crime because it consists in wrongdoing which directly threatens society.'
Allen, Legal Duties, p. 233.
"'Hibbert, Jurisprudence, p. 188.
"OPotter, English Law. p. 295. Crimes in the Roman Law were "'delicta publica," but
this was not because of their tendency to injure the public. An English coure speaks of a cer-
tain crime as being "private in particular yet public in its consequences." Reg. v. Arbell, 6
Mod. 42.
2031 Yale Law Review 241; 38 Dickinson Law Review p. 226. "'There are many cases
where an act which is not criminal in private becomes penal by the publicity which attends its
perpetration." Anderson v. Com., 5 Rand. 627.
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and hygienic, of varying degrees of importance, which may make an act
socially undesirable and render it socially expedient to make such an act
criminal. The idea, often ill-conceived and mistaken, that an act is intrinsic-
ally wrongful or socially inexpedient has prompted so many of the prohibi-
tions of the criminal law that immorality and public injury cannot be dis-
regarded as distinguishing characteristics of crime, although such qualities
are sometimes highly artificial and not self evident. 21
THE DUTY VIOLATED
Some authorities assert that the distinction between crimes and civil in-
juries depends upon the character of the duty which is violated. Applying
this distinction, it is held that a breach of an absolute duty is generally a
crime, and the remedy is punishment of the wrongdoer, not compensation to
the injured party; and a breach of a relative duty is always a civil injury, and
the remedy is compensation or restitution to the injured party.
A duty means liability to a legal sanction, i. e., some evil to be suffered in
consequence of infringing a rule of law A person who will incur a legal
sanction if he acts, is under a legal duty not to act. A duty is owed to the
person who, according to law, may enforce the legal remedy for its breach.
This person is the only one who may determine whether, in case of breach,
the sanction shall or shall not be exacted. By him alone the sanction is ex-
igible or remissible. Absolute duties are owed only to the state which imposes
them. Relative duties are owed to persons other than the state vhich imposes
them, and correlate with rights vested in the person to whom they are owed.
The distinction between absolute and relative duties does not depend on
the purpose for which such duties are imposed but upon the different persons
to whom each is owed. Relative duties, of course, particularly and im-
mediately regard the welfare of the person in whom is vested the correlative
right; but many. absolute duties also regard particularly the rights of individ-
ual persons, as, e. g., the duty not to assault a person or to steal his property;
and all duties, whether absolute or relative, regard ultimately the welfare of
the community at large, as they provide for the peaceful pursuit by men of
their vocations, and for security of life and property.
All crimes are breaches of absolute duties, and breaches of absolute
duties are almost always crimes, but the latter is not universally true, for the
breach of a contract with the state is merely a civil injury for which the rem-
edy is the same as that for breach of contract with a private person. The fact
that an act violates a duty to the state and that only the state can, enforce or
remit the sanction does not make the act a crime unless the sanction is pun-
itory.
The distinction under discussion, therefore, becomes accurate only if a
crime is defined as the breach of an absolute duty, the sanction of which is
21APen. Legal Duties. p. 237.
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punishment, exigible or remissible at the discretion of the state, acting accord-
ing to law; and a civil injury is defined as the breach of a relative duty, the
sanction of which is compensation or restitution, exigible or remissible at the
discretion of the person whose right has been infringed.
THE POWER OF REMISSION
The power of remission, which depends upon the incidence of the duty
which is violated, has been asserted to be the "real and salient difference" be-
tween crimes and civil injuries. 2 2 "It has been suggested by an eminent
authority23 that the real distinction between criminal and civil offences is that,
in the case of the former, the Crown has the power to remit the penalties,
while it has no power to waive the compensation due for the latter.24 This
is true as a general rule, but there are important exceptions, and, in any
event, it does not aid us very much in our search for a true and useful distinc-
tion between crimes and civil injuries.
As a general rule, crimes are.wrongs whose sanction is remissible by the
state and not by any private individual, and civil injuries are wrongs, whose
sanction is remissible by the person injured and not by the state. But there
are crimes whose sanctions are remissible by private individuals,2" and in some
cases the state has the power of remitting a civil sanction. 2e
The distinction, even if it were an exact one, would not be very helpful,
as it leads simply to a circulus inextricabilis. To assert that a crime is a
wrong whose sanction the state alone can remit gives rise to the question:
What sanctions can the state remit ?, and the answer is criminal sanctions.
2 7
THE REMEDY
Eminent authorities assert that the "only real distinction" between
crimes and civil injuries is not the nature of the act which is committed or the
character of the injury inflicted or the kind of duty violated, but the nature
of the remedy applied. "A wrong regarded as the subjecf matter of civil pro-
ceedings is called a civil wrong; one regarded as the subject matter of criminal
proceedings is termed a criminal wrong or crime.
' *2
"The only certain lines of distinction are to be found in the nature of
remedy given and the procedure to enforce the remedy. If the remedy given
22Kenny. Criminal Law, 14th. ed., p. 14.
2sAustin, Jurisprudence, Lecture 27.
24jenks, The Book of English Law, p. 192.
2516 C. J. 92.
26Kerny, Criminal Law, 14th. ed., p. 16.
27Winfield, The Law of Tort, p. 197. Read also Allen, Legal Duties, p. 227.
2SSalmond, Jurisprudence, 7th ed., p. 117. "The supposed difference in nature between
crimes and 'torts is a difference in emphasis or point of view on one hand and procedure on
the other." 36 Yale Law Journal, p. 836. See 1 C. J. 1012.
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is compensation, damages, or a penalty imposed by a civil action, the wrong
so redressed is a civil wrong. If the remedy given is punishment of the ac-
cused which is enforced by a prosecution at the suit of the crown, the wrong
so redressed is criminal in its nature.' '
This distinction involves both the form and the purpose of the procedure.
The procedure must be in form a prosecution and its purpose muust be the im-
position of punishment. Procedure which is a prosecution in form is some-
times prescribed for the redress of civil injuries, and punishment is sometimes
imposed as an incident of civil proceedings."0
Other authorities assert that though procedure is certainly a genuine dif-
ference between crimes and civil injuries, it is not the sole or even the prin-
cipal difference, and that the reasoning which makes it such is tantalizing.
"The difference between crimes and civil injuries is more than one of pro-
cedure; it depends upon the nature of the duty infringed, on the punitory
character of the sanction, and on the fact that the sanction is enforceable and
remissible only at the discretion of the sovereign acting according to law, also
on the mens rea.''a1
It is at least obvious that a distinction based, not upon the intrinsic nature of
the acts distinguished nor the elements which compose them, but, upon the
legal consequences of committing such acts, gives us no indication why cer-
tain types of misconduct are made criminal while other types are made only
civil injuries.
MENS REA
The requirement of mens rea as an element of responsibility has been
asserted to be the test by which to distinguish crimes from civil injuries. 2
This doctrine is based, in part at least, upon the assumption that in the early
days there was an entire absence of the notion of wrongful intention in the
20Holdsworth, History of English Law, vol. 8. p. 306; Kenny, Criminal Law, 14th ed., p.
11; Stephens, Commentaries, vol. 4, p. 4. "Even this test sometimes fails to establish a clear
line of difference." Holdsworth, supra. It has been said that this distinction is a consequence
of the fact that crimes are acts which injure the public-acts from which the state feels the
menace of injury and which it desires to prevent, and punishment may be the only adequate
measure of prevention, Stephens, vol. 4, p. 5. See I C. J. 1012.
30State v. Manchester Railroad, 52 N. H. 528; 38 Dickinson Law Review, p. 217; 1 C. J.
1012. The ultimate purpose of enforcing all legal liability, civil or criminal, is the prevention
of wrongs through deterrence. There is a manifest difference, however, between the im-
mediate purpose of the law in dealing with the two kinds of wrongs. Derby Corp. v. Derby-
shire C. C. (1897) A. C. 550.
3'Hibbert, Jurisprudence. p. 190. Any description of crime which centers either in pro-
cedure or the fact of punishment amounts only to a formal and not to a material definition.
Allen, Legal Duties, p. 223. Punishment as opposed to compensation is the basis of the or-
igin of the distinction but there are other factors. Potter, English Law, p. 303.
S2Holdsworth, History of English Law, vol. 3, p. 374; Jenks, Book of English Law, p. 192.
But see Holmes, The Common Law, p. 49,
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law of tort, and it has therefore not been universally accepted 31
At the present time the sanctions of the law are undoubtedly more fre-
quently inflicted for external conduct which is not the result of any blameable
state of mind in civil than in criminal cases, and torts of absolute liability
are not usually also crimes. 34  But there are crimes of absolute liability, and
the tortious character of many acts depends upon the existence of a wrong-
ful intention."5
ACTS WHICH ARE BOTH
Since the distinction between crimes and civil injuries does not consist
primarily of any intrinsic difference in the nature of the acts themselves, but
in the legal proceedings to which they give rise, it follows that the classifica-
tions are not mutually exclusive, and that the same act may be both a crime
and a civil injurys " Blackstone 36 says that every crime is also a civil injury.
In the case of most crimes this is true, but there are acts which are crimes and
which are not civil injuries because :
1. They affect the right of the state or public alone and violate no defi-
nite person's right,3r as, e. g., treason: or
2. Though aimed at individuals they are checked before any harm is
done, as, e.g., forgery;31 or
3. They affect injuriously only the criminal himself, as, e. g.. in some
jurisdictions, suicide; ° or
4. A public policy of some sort renders it inexpedient to allow a civil
action for criminal acts which do injury to individuals, as, e. g., perjury. 40
Whether an act which is a crime is also a civil injury may usually be de-
termined by inquiring whether the act causes damage to any definite person."1
There is, however, no corresponding test by which to determine whether an
13Potter. English Law, p. 309, 315.
34Kenny, Criminal Law, 14th. ed., p. 38.
35Allen, Legal Duties, p. 236, 239.
'"Foster v. Com., 8 W. 6 S. 77; Rump v. Com., 30 Pa. 475.
SeVol. 4, p. 6.
17 'Most duties not to commit crimes are defined by actual definitional consequences, and
these consequences are usually such as, if they happen, will violate some person's right, so that
crimes are generally violations of private right." Terry, Anglo-American Law, sec. 524.
"There are many kinds of acts which do not injure, any specific person at all, or at all events in-
jure all persons equally, and for these there are no 'private remedies for the excellent reason
that they are not private wrongs." Allen, Legal Duties. p. 234.
8826 C. J. p. 907.
8960 C. J. p. 995.
4048 C. J. p. 819.
4'Geldort, Essential Elements of English Law, p. 223: "Nearly all crimes to person or
property are also torts." Allen, Legal Duties, p. 235.
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act which is a civil injury is also a crime.42 It is only possible to make the
rough historical generalization that civil injuries have been erected into
crimes whenever the law making power has come to regard the mere civil rem-
edy as inadequate because of the great immorality or evil example of the acts,
or their dangerous tendencies, or far-reaching consequences, or of the temp-
tation to commit them, or the likelihood of their being committed by persons
too poor to pay damages.
4 3
The same act may constitute both a crime and a civil injury but the
crime and civil injury may have different names, as, e. g., trespass and larc-
eny. 4" The same name may be used to describe both a crime and a tort, of
which the essential elements are not the same, as, e. g., seduction.
45
MERGER
The civil remedy for certain crimes which caused injury to definite per-
sons was considered by the common law to be destroyed or suspended.
Civil remedies for homicide were "merged" in the criminal offense." "In a
civil court," said Lord Ellenborough, "the death of a human being cannot be
complained of as an injury.-41 This thoroughly irrational rule, which can
only be accepted as a fact without being justified as a principle, had two per-
fectly distinct applications : (1) The representative of a deceased victim of a
tort which had caused the victim's death could not sue in a representative
capacity; (2) A plaintiff could not sue a defendant for a wrong committed by
the defendant to the plaintiff when that wrong consisted of causing the death
of a third person in whose life the plaintiff had an interest.
The first rule was simply an application of the maxim actio personalis
moritur cum persona. The veil of obscurity covers the origin4 of this maxim.
Its first appearance in its modern form is in Coke's report of Pinchon's' Case"4
in 1609, and it is quite possible that Coke, who was a great inventor of Latin
maxims, gave it its modern shape. But the idea that personal actions died
with the person was well known long before this and had been confined
principally to actions in tort. 50
The maxim, which applied to the liability of a representative to be sued
42Kenny, Criminal Law, 14th. ed., p. 21 "Tort is nearly always criminal as well but
not invariably. A great many torts are also crimes." Allen, Legal Duties, pp. 221, 236. "A
civil Injury is not as a rule a crime." Hibbert, Jurisprudence. p. 180.
,8"The reason why the sovereign declares certain wrongs crimes is that he deems a civil
sanction insufficient as a preventive." Hibbert. Jurisprudence. p. 186.
"Miller, Criminal Law. p. 349.
'5Euhor v. Kistler, 14 Pa. 282.
4817 C. J. 1181.
41Baker v. Bolton, I Camp. 493.
"8Goudy, Essays in Legal History, p. 216.
"99 Coke's Rep, 87a.
"0Holdsworth, History of English Law, vol. 3, p. 578.
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as well as to his right to sue, has been so modified by statutes that the excep-
tions have, in a large measure, eaten up the rule. Perhaps because the
absence of legal liability was less onerous in practice than the absence of a
right to sue. legislatures have usually intervened to give representatives rights
of action at an earlier date than they have intervened to place them under
legal liability.51
In some jurisdictions statutes provide that where a wrongful act causes
the death of the victim the cause of action shall survive the death, and pro-
vide for the recovery of damages caused by the death itself.5 2 A Pennsyl-
vania statute merely provides that "no action hereafter brought to recover
damages for injuries to the person * * * shall abate by reason of the death
of the plaintiff; but the personal representatives may be substituted as plain-
tiffs and prosecute the suit to final judgment and satisfaction. "53 "This is
predicated not only of a previously existing right of action in the injured
party, but, also that he availed himself of it by bringing suit in his lifetime;
and its purpose was to obviate the effect of the general maxim, Actio person-
alis moritur cum persona.'"5
4
The recovery under this statute is for the personal injury and "it is a
mistake to suppose that the recovery is for the death," but the damages in-
crude "the value of the life," 55 which means not its value "to others" but "the
value of the advantages of which the injured party was deprived because of
diminution or loss of earning power.'58
The second application of the principle under discussion obviously has
nothing to do with the actio personalis, etc., as both plaintiff and defendant are
still alive. The death is simply an element in the cause of action. The origin
of this application ig probably to be found in the rule that if a cause of action
in tort disclosed a felony the right of action in tort was affected51 It would
seem to follow, therefore, that the right of action for death caused by a felony
should have been suspended and not destroyed, and that there should be a
right to sue if the tortious act causing death did not amount to a felony. But
the logic of the situation was disregarded and in all cases where the tort re-
sulted in death a right of action was denied.
This rule was obviously unjust, and, because based upon a misreading of
legal history, technically unsound. It has been changed by statute in a
majority of jurisdictions."' including Pennsylvania.- Statutes of this type
IsHoldsworth, History of English Law, vol. 3, p. 584.
5217 C. J. 1186.
saAct of April 15, 1851, P. L. 674.
54Birch v. Railway, 165 Pa. 339.55Maher v. Phila. Traction Co., 181 Pa. 391.
56McCafferty v. Railroad, 193 Pa. 339.
57Holdsworth, History English Law, vol. 3, p. 334.
5817 C. J. 1184.
59Act of April 15, 1851. P. L. 069
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create a new cause of action, and do not provide merely for the survival of a
right of action previously possessed by the deceased;"' but this new cause of
action is, it seems, not entirely independent of a cause of action of the de-
ceased, because if his cause of action is barred by a recovery"1 or a release,"s
or if he could not have maintained an action had death not ensued, the action
for his death cannot be maintained."
SUSPENSION OF REMEDY
The question whether at common law the civil action for an act which
constituted both a civil wrong and a felony was "merged in the felony," or
suspended until the felon had been prosecuted, or was unaffected by the fel-
onious character of the tortious act is involved in some doubt. "
As early as 16075 it was expressly stated that the right of action was
completely lost, and there was considerable early authority in support of this
doctrine. 6A But beginning in the first quarter of the seventeenth century, there
is a series of cases to the effect that the fact that a civil injury amounted to a
felony did not destroy, but merely suspended the right of action. 7 At a time
when a felon's property was forfeited upon his conviction so that there would
be no effectual civil remedy afterwards, the compendious statement that "the
trespass merged in the felony" was substantially, if not technically, true, and
whether the cause of action in tort was wholly lost or merely suspended was
a purely academic question.
But the question had ceased to be wholly academic in the sixteenth cen-
tury, and, with the entire abolition of forfeiture, became a very practical one;
and it is asserted that it came? to be the settled rule that the civil remedy was
suspended but not destroyed, 6
A doubt whether the rule, even in this qualified form, ever existed has been
recently expressed,6 9 and there is apparent in quarters of high authority a
strong disposition to discredit it as a mere cantilena of the text writers found-
ed on ambiguous or misapprehended cases or upon dicta which were open
6OBirch v. Railway, 165 Pa. 339.
6lBirch v. Railway, 165 Pa. 339; Hill v. Railroad, 178 Pa, 223.
S2Hill v. Railroad, 178 Pa. 223.
-Hughes v. Railroad, 176 Pa. 254.
64Holdsworth, History of English Law, vol. 3, p. 331: 1 C. 1. 954; 1 Cyc. 681; Pollock and
Maitland. History of English Law, vol. 2. p. 688; no distinction existed between actions ex
delicto and actions ex contractu nor between suits at law and suits in chancery. I Cyc. 683.
"Higgins v. Butcher. Yelv. 89.
66Holdsworth, History of English Law, vol. 3, p. 332.
OTHoldsworth, History of English Law, vol. 3, p. 333. The various alleged reasons for the
rule are discussed in I Cyc. 683. The suspension was only until the criminal prosecution
could be had and the action might then be maintained whether the prosecution resulted in a
conviction or an acquittal. I C. J, 955.
68Holdsworth, History of English Law, vol. 3, p. 33.
891 C. J. 955; Wells v. Abrahams, L. R. 7 Q. B. 554; Miller. Criminal Law, p. 21.
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to the same objection.) "But the defence does certainly exist" in England. 7'
In some of the United States the rule that the civil remedy was suspended
until the termination of the criminal prosecution was adopted as a part of the
common law. Other states refused to adopt it for the reason that it was in-
applicable to conditions in America; and at present in a great majority of the
states it hag been either repudiated by the courts or abrogated by statute.
72
The rule that the private cause of action was merged in the felony seems
never to have been adopted in Pennsylvania, but it was held that the private
action was suspended until the public prosecution for the offense had been
duly conducted and ended,73 This was later interpreted to mean that the
trial, but not the bringing of the civil action should be suspended until the
prosecution had terminated.74
A statute now provides; "In all cases of felony heretofore committed, or
which may hereafter be committed, it shall and may be lawful for any person
injured or aggrieved by such felony, to have and maintain his action against
the person or persons guilty of such felony, in like manner as if the offense
committed had not been feloniously done; and in no case whatever, shall the
action of the party injured, be deemed, taken or adjudged to be merged in' the
felony, or in any manner affected thereby.'" 75 The common law rule that the
civil remedy was merged or suspended was never applied in cases of mis-
demeanors.76
CONCURRENT REDRESS
According to the common law, when an act constituted both a crime and
a civil wrong, the punishment for the crime could not be imposed and com-
pensation or reparation for the civil wrong awarded in a single judicial pro-
c-eeding.17 In jurisdictions where the Civil Law is in force punishment is fre-
quently imposed and compensation or reparation awarded in a single pro-
ceeding.71 This virtually makes the injured person a third party to the pro-
ceeding and many pecuilar consequences follow.
This practice removes the anomaly and injustice so frequent in the com-
mon law system, by which the state's penalty is duly exacted, but the injured
701 Cyc. 681. For limitations and exceptions to the rule, see 1 C. J. 956.
?'Kenny Criminal Law, 14th. ed., p. 97; Smith v. Selkirk, (1914) 3 K. B. 98. "Prior to
the case of Smith v. Selkirk the question had been resolved at different times land by different
authorities in three different ways," Miller, Criminal Law, p. 21. "Even in England the rule
is not now of much practical importance.- I C. J. 955. As to the method of taking advant-
age of the rule, see 1 Cyc. 683, 1 C. J. 955.
721 C. J. 955; Miller, Criminal Law, p. 21.
?'Hutchison v. Bank, 41 Pa. 42; Bank v. Turnley, 1 Miles, 312.
7'Keyser v. Rodgers, 50 Pa. 275. See 1 Cyc. 686.
71Act of March 31, 1860, sec. 71 P. L. 447.
16Com. v. Dickerson, 7 W. N. C. 433.
77See Train, The Prisoner at the Bar, p. 129; 16 C. J. 1379.
78See Title V, Penal Code of the Phillipine Islands; 16 C. J. 1380.
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person, for whose protection the penalty is supposed to have been created, is
left without redress.
The superiority of the Civil Law practice, which plays a large part in all
continental codes, is so manifest that it has been adopted to a limited extent
by statute in both England79 and the United States.80
In Pennsylvania a statute provides that upon conviction for robbery,
burglary, or larceny of property, or for otherwise unlawfully and fraudulently
obtaining the same, or for receiving property, knowing it to have been stolen,
the defendant, in addition to the prescribed punishment, shall be ordered to
restore to the owner the property taken or to pay the value of the same, or
so much thereof as may not be restored; and that on all convictions for forg-
ery, uttering, cheating, or false pretenses, a similar order for restitution or
compensation shall be made.?"' The language of this statute is very broad,
"requiring in almost every criminal offense including in its perpetration the
obtaining of money or other valuable thing, in addition to the prescribed pun-
ishment, that the defendant shall be adjudged to restore to the owner such
money or property or to pay him the value." But the statute is applicable
only when property is obtained, and although forgery and burglary are men-
tioned in the statute, it is, of course, possible to commit either of these crimes
without obtaining any property.12
A statute also provides that upon a conviction for forcible entry or forc-
ible detainer, the defendant shall be sentenced to make restitution of the lands
and tenements entered or detained.
83
The Act of March 31, 1860. section nine, provides that if the party in-
jured or damaged by certain misdemeanors shall acknowledge, before the
committing magistrate of the court, if an indictment has been found, that he
has received satisfaction for such injury and damage, it shall be lawful for the
magistrate in his discretion to discharge the prisoner or for the court in their
discretion to order a nolle prosequi to be entered. This statute in effect pro-
vides for the termination of prosecutions for lesser offenses by the settlement
of the civil disputes which are involved in the same transactions.
CIVIL LIABILITY FOR STATUTORY CRIMES
A conflict of authority exists upon the question whether, when conduct
which is harmful to an individual, but which is lawful, is made criminal by
79Kenny. Criminal Law. 14th ed.. p. 95: Winfield. The Law of Tort, p. 201; 16 C. J. 1379.
8016 C. 1. 1379. In some states a criminal proceeding is often used for the purpose of
securing restitution to the injured party by suspending the execution of sentence upon the con-
dition that the defendant make some compensation to the injured party. Statd v. Hilton, 151
N. C. 687, 65 S. E. 1011. A federal statute gives the courts power to require persons released
on probation to make reparation to the injured person, U. S. Code Title 18, Sec. 724.
S2Act of March 31, 1860, Sec. 179, P. L. 382.
s2Huntzinger v. Com., 97 Pa. 336.
OSAct of March 31, 1860. Sec. 21, 22, P. L. 382.
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statute, it is by implication made a civil injury redressible at the suit of the
individual whom it injures. The question "often comes up in one form or an-
other, and it is desirable to recognize as exactly as possible the principles in-
volved."5' 4  Attempts to answer the question have resulted in divergent
rules.8 5
It has been stated that the "true rule" or "better doctrine" is that it is
a matter of legislative intention, and that the violation of a criminal; statute or
ordinance will give rise to a civil cause of action where the person asserting
the right is one of the class for whose benefit the regulation was enacted and
where his particular interest which was injured was intended to be protected
against the particular risk or hazard which proximately caused the injury."
8
The rule in Pennsylvania remains an unsettled matter. In Mack v.
Wright 7 the court declared that "the presumption is that where a statute im-
poses a duty where none existed before, the remedy provided therein for the
breach of the duty is exclusive." It was subsequently asserted that "the rule
in Mack v. Wright is not without exception" and that "if a plain duty is im-
posed for the benefit of individuals and the penalty is obviously inadequate to
compel performance, the implication will be strong, if not conclusive, that the
remedy was meant to be merely cumulative to such remedy as the common
law gives when a duty to an individual is neglected."
'8 s "This case," it has
been said, "settled the law in Pennsylvania." 
'9 But a later case declares,
"Perhaps our cases on this point are not wholly reconcilable at least if full
weight is given to the dicta therein."90
EFFECT OF JUDGMENTS
A judgment of conviction in a criminal case does not establish civil liabil-
ity in a subsequent civil case growing out of the same transaction, nor is a
judgment of acquittal a bar to a civil action against the same defendant; and
neither judgment is admissible as evidence in a subsequent civil case to estab-
lish or disprove the cause of action."1 Such judgments "in subsequent civil
proceedings founded on the same facts" are not "proof of anything except the
mere fact of their rendition.""2
A judgment for the plaintiff in a civil case does not establish the crim-
inal responsibility of the defendant for matters rising out of the same trans-
8427 Harvard Law Review, p. 317.
851 C. J. 957; 1 Cyc. 679; 46 Harvard Law Review, 453; 27 Illinois Law Review, 318.
8611 Boston University Law Review, p. 227.
97180 Pa. 472.
8sWestervelt v. Dives, 231 Pa. 472.
89Danner v. Wells, 248 Pa. 105.
9oCom. v. Wilkins, 271 Pa. 523.
9134 C. J, 970; Wilson v. Wilson, 100 Pa. Superior Ct. 451; Harger v. Thomas, 44 Pa.
128.
zWilson v. Wilson, 100 Pa. Superior Ct. 451.
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action, nor is it a bar to a subsequent criminal prosecution of the defendant;
and a judgment for the defendant in a civil action is not a bar to a subsequent
criminal prosecution;13 and neither judgment is admissible as evidence to prove
or disprove the facts in a subsequent criminal case. 94  The pending of a civil
action cannot be pleaded in abatement or in bar of a criminal prosecution.
EVIDENCE
Evidence given in a judicial proceeding is, under certain circumstances,
admissible in a subsequent judicial proceeding, provided there is the requisite
identity of parties and issues in the two proceedings. Where a person is
prosecuted criminally and sued civilly for the same act there is not the re-
quisite identity for the application of this rule, and the evidence given in one
proceeding is not admissible in the othery 6
9334 C. J. 972
4"Judgments in criminal cases where the state is the prosecutor are generally held in-
admissible to establish the facts of a civil case and vice versa." Wingrove v. Central Trac-
tion Co., 237 Pa. 549. 16 C. J. 97.
95Com. v. Hurd, 177 Pa. 481; Foster v. Com., 8 W. & S. 77.
961n 22 C. J. 431 itb is said that the evidence is admissible. McKelvey says the matter is
not clearly settled, Evidence, p. 345. Wigmore says the evidence ought to be admitted. The
Pennsylvania court has held that the evidence is not admissible. Harger v. Thomas, 44 Pa.
128; Marcinkiewicz v. Kutawich, 87 Pa. Superior Ct. 60.
